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THE
MASOCHIAN
WOMAN:
A fantasy of
male desire?

JENNIFER KOMOROWSKI
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The Masochian woman is a figure who stages what is at
stake for women when desire and the law come together.
This requires an examination of the conflict that exists between
the idea that women’s masochism is the fantasy of men and
the truth about who wields power in the masochistic theatre.
Thus, the inquiry into women’s masochism means following
Jacques Lacan’s conception of women’s masochism in Anxiety,
which describes it as holding a “completely different meaning,
a fairly ironic meaning, and a completely different scope” from
the pervert’s masochism or moral masochism (Lacan, 2016,
p.190). Beginning with a critical analysis of Freud and Lacan’s
theories on masochism, I will decipher what feminine masochism
is and why we are usually only presented with cases where the
man exhibits this type of masochistic desire. In order to reach
a full understanding of this different and ironic meaning for
women’s masochism, it is important to examine the connection between the gaze and masochism to comprehend the way
in which the fantasy of the Other is an essential mechanism in
the design of the masochistic theatre. However, connecting
these two perversions as both belonging on the passive side
of the erotic register, as Lacan does in “The Function and
Field of Speech and Language in Psychoanalysis”, does not go
far enough, and it must be understood that masochism itself is
inherently reliant on the gaze as an essential part of the mas-
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ochistic theatre, and allows it to function as a fantasy. Thus, for
masochism to exist in women, even if it is ironic, Lacan proposes
that the fantasy imagined by the Other, or the male fantasy,
is what is enacted. This leads to the question of what role
anxiety plays in the male fantasy. Lacan believes the masochist’s aim is the anxiety of the Other. If woman is enacting a male
fantasy, and one which causes anxiety in the face of the Other’s
desire, and man sustains his jouissance through his own anxiety, what is this anxiety? I believe Deleuze provides the answer
to this question in his own discussion of the three women
figures in Masoch’s work. It is the figure of the Grecian woman, who “believes in the independence of women and in the
fleeting nature of love; for her the sexes are equal” (Deleuze,
1967, p.47), that is the cause of anxiety for man. For Aphrodite,
equality between men and women is the “crucial moment
at which she gains dominance over man, for ‘man trembles as
soon as woman becomes his equal’” (47-48). In Écrits, Lacan
reminds us of Freud’s advice “not to reduce the supplement of
the feminine with respect to the masculine tothe complement of
the passive with respect to the active” (2005, p. 615). In representing what Lacan calls the ‘absolute Other’ the Masochian
woman is able to wield the power of law through her control of
the masochistic mise en scène.
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The Masochian Woman:
A fantasy of male desire?

1

JENNIFER KOMOROWSKI
Centre for the Study of Theory and Criticism, University of Western Ontario

I

n Lacan’s “Guiding Remarks for a
Convention on Female Sexuality,”
he posits the question, “Can we rely
on what masochistic perversion owes
to male invention and conclude that female
masochism is a fantasy of male desire?” In
my discussion of women’s masochism, I trace
the connections between masochism and the
gaze in psychoanalysis, which has important
implications for the fantasy formation and the
theatricality of women’s masochism. Lacan
would go on to later state in Seminar X: Anxiety that “that women’s masochism is a male
fantasy” (2016, p.190), seemingly confirming
this question from his earlier writings. By
tracing the connections between the gaze as
objet a and masochism in the work of both
Freud and Lacan it leads to an understanding
of process involved in the formation of the
masochistic fantasy, and its extimate nature.
Thus, by transferring this understanding of
masochism to the Masochian Woman reveals
the irony which Lacan saw in the concept
of a masochistic woman, but also the power
relations involved in the theatre of masochism.
To come to a theoretical awareness of the
1
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Masochian Woman, it is also necessary to
understand who she is not, and therefore
this paper will also examine several figures of
women who display characteristics of masochism, but do not fully embody the identity of
the woman I seek.

Masochism and the Gaze
In Freud’s Three Essays on the Theory of
Sexuality (1905/1924) he names sadism and
masochism as “the most common and the
most significant of all the perversions” (p. 23),
and, following Krafft-Ebing’s naming of
these perversions, he emphasizes the way
that Krafft-Ebing’s nomenclature “[brings]
into prominence the pleasure in any form of
humiliation or subjection” (1924, p. 23). In
his discussion of masochism, Freud gives a
general description of the perversion as being
comprised of “any passive attitude towards
sexual life and the sexual object, the extreme
instance of which appears to be that in which
satisfaction is conditional upon suffering
physical or mental pain at the hands of the
sexual object. Masochism, in the form of a

Lacan poses this question in “Guiding Remarks for a Convention on Female Sexuality” in Écrits.
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perversion, seems to be further removed from
the normal sexual aim than its counterpart
[sadism]” (1924, p. 24). This explanation
was added by Freud in 1924, along with the
footnote stating: “I have been led to distinguish
a primary or erotogenic masochism, out of
which two later forms, feminine and moral
masochism, have developed. Sadism which
cannot find employment in actual life is
turned round upon the subject’s own self and
so produces a secondary masochism, which is
superadded to the primary kind” (p. 24). The
classifications of different types of masochism
are also outlined by Sigmund Freud in “The
Economic Problem of Masochism” (1924), and
his discussion is centered around Feminine
masochism because, for Freud, it is “most
accessible to our observation and least
problematical, and it can be surveyed in all
its relations” (p. 276). According to Freud,
this Feminine form is based not only in the
erotogenic form, pleasure in pain, but also
“places the subject in a characteristically female
situation” (p. 277). This type of masochism is
only ever discussed in the male subject, and
since women already exist in these ‘characteristically female situations,’ Freud never
seems to consider diagnosing the perversion
in a female patient. Therefore, to understand
what it means for a woman to engage in
masochism we must also consider Lacan’s
idea of women’s masochism as holding a
“completely different meaning, a fairly ironic
meaning, and a completely different scope”
from either the male pervert’s masochism
or moral masochism (Lacan, 2016, p. 190).
However, that does not necessarily mean that
Freud’s investigation into male masochism
is unhelpful. It provides us the means for
understanding how and why women engage
in masochism.
If we take a step back to Freud’s earlier
work discussing Krafft-Ebing’s naming of
sadism and masochism in the Three Essays on

the Theory of Sexuality, and the emphasis on
humiliation and subjection which Freud finds
innate to this perversion, the language used
in this passage echoes the preceding section
in the Three Essays regarding ‘Touching and
Looking’. Here, Freud discusses the pleasure
in looking (scopophilia) and, like sadism and
masochism, he proposes that perversions
of looking occur in two forms: the active
and the passive. He goes on in the section
‘Sadism and Masochism’ to align the pain
of masochism with both disgust and shame
as forces that “[stand] in opposition and
resistance to the libido” (Freud, 1924, p. 25).
Thus, for Freud, the passive act of looking/
being looked at and masochism are aligned
together on the side of the Nirvana principle,
which “expresses the trend of the death
instinct,” although under modification by the
libido (Freud, 1924, p. 275). The subject who
does not seek his own good is influenced by
the death drive, and this is manifest clinically,
according to Freud, in various ways, such as
repetition compulsion, or masochism, which
relies on the gaze to function.
Bringing the discussion of the gaze back
to Lacan’s 1949 essay “The Mirror Stage as
Formative of the Function of the I as Revealed in Psychoanalytic Experience” Lacan
first explores the gaze and the role it plays in
the formation of the I. Here, he describes the
mirror stage “as an identification, in the full
sense that analysis gives to the term: namely,
the transformation that takes place in the
subject when he assumes an image” (Lacan,
2005, p. 76). This stage of identification is understood to involve a specular image reflected
for the child to see himself, and this process
therefore involves an exteriority in order to
resolve the analysand’s “discordance with his
own reality” (Lacan, 2005, p. 76). The end
of the mirror stage, which occurs when the
I is linked to “socially elaborated situations”
(Lacan, 2005, p. 79), is also important, as
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Lacan points out, saying, “It is this moment
that decisively tips the whole of human
knowledge (savoir) into being mediated by
the other’s desire” (Lacan, 2005, p. 79). This
hints at the further development of the mirror
stage which focuses around the ‘other’s desire.’
Adrian Johnston provides a succinct description of the later, 1960s mirror stage:

language-using (and language-used)
big(ger) Others bathe the infant in a
cascade of statements and behaviors
whose saturating effects endow the
specular components of the mirroring
moment, Lacan’s primal scene of
inaugural identification, with their
special, fateful status. The petit a(utre)
of the child’s forming ego, partially
bound up with imagistic representation, is originally and primordially a
precipitate of “the desire of the Other”.
(Johnston, 2013, p. 256)

Here, Johnston brings together the mirror
stage together with later Lacan, and, in doing
so, ties the literal, specular activity of seeing
oneself in the mirror to the non-specular gaze
as empty objet a.
These statements regarding the mirror
stage focus our attention on the desire of the
other/Other. The idea that “man’s desire is
the desire of the Other” (Lacan, 2016, p. 22)
is reiterated throughout Lacan’s work, and
will be key, in analysis, to understanding the
function of masochism for the woman analysand. When Lacan states that knowledge is
mediated by the other’s desire, later to become
the big Other, he is referring to an “intimate
exteriority” (Lacan, 1999, p. 139), or extimacy,
which is naturally mimetic. The process of the
mirror stage is not isolated to the individual,
but, as Johnston outlines it in his article, is a
process which depends on the influence of
big Other(s). Johnston provides the following
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description for this important process:

Insofar as the ego itself, as what
becomes intimate ‘me-ness,’ is born
by crystallizing around a core kernel
of external Other-subjects’ fantasyformations, it could be said to be an
instance of extimacy in Lacan’s precise
sense of this neologism. Put differently,
at the very nucleus of the recognized
‘me’ resides a misrecognized (à la
Lacanian méconnaissance) ‘not-me,’
something ‘in me more than myself ’.
(Johnston, 2013, p. 256)

Thus, our own fantasies and desires are never
truly our own because the formation of what
makes me who I am is built around a kernel
of extimacy. So, when Lacan states in Seminar
X: Anxiety “that women’s masochism is a male
fantasy,” (2017, p. 190) this is what he means.
He is referring to the conceptualization of
a masochistic woman, which becomes the
kernel for the fantasy of masochism for
the subject.
Lacan directly links the concept that
“man’s desire is the desire of the Other” to the
gaze in “What is a Picture?” when he states:
“I would say that it is a question of a sort
of desire on the part of the Other, at the end
of which is the showing (le donner-à-voir)”
(1981, p. 115). The particular word showing
that Lacan uses here indicates to us that the
gaze is not merely a process of being seen,
but requires a conscious showing on the part
of the subject who is being seen, and literally
translates from the original French le donnerà-voir as giving-to-see-it. Lacan goes on to
pose the question, “How could this showing
satisfy something, if there is not some appetite
of the eye on the part of the person looking?”
(1981, p. 115), and he feels that this reveals
the truth about the eye: that it is a voracious
and evil eye (1981, p. 115). What is not
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mentioned here is what this showing reveals
about the one who is performing the ‘givingto-see-it’. This ‘giving-to-see-it’ represents
an unstated agreement between the one who
sees and the one who shows, not unlike the
masochistic contract, which reveals that this
giving not only satisfies the appetite of the
eye of the viewer, but also satisfies some desire
on the part of the one who gives. For Freud,
this ‘giving-to-see-it’ is another form of the
perversion of looking because it supplants, or
overtakes the importance, of the normal sexual
aim. Freud provides three cases in which
looking becomes perversion: when looking is
“restricted exclusively to the genitals,” when it
is connected to disgust, or when it supplants
the importance of the normal sexual aim
(1924, p. 23). However, when this ‘givingto-see-it’ is incorporated into the masochistic
fantasy, and if Freud’s classification of what
is considered a perversion is strictly followed,
then the presentation of the masochistic
individual in a submissive or humiliating
position as “visual impression” is simply “the
most frequent pathway along which libidinal
excitation is aroused” (Freud, 1924, p. 22), and
as long as the act of looking is only preparatory to the normal sexual aim, this visual arousal
can be considered a way to raise the libido to
a “higher artistic aim” (Freud, 1924, p. 23). As
I will later discuss in regards to masochism,
the theatrical act of looking and showing
is usually a step in the script of masochism
which does not completely take the place of
touching or the normal sexual aim, but instead
a passive, masochistic form of looking can be
considered an “artistic and theatrical display”
(Bronfen, 1996, p. 60) by Freud.
In “I Hear You With My Eyes” Žižek
expands further on Lacan’s ‘evil eye’ concept
and categorizes the voice and the gaze as objet
a which align with life and death. However,
simply connecting these two perversions
as both belonging on the passive side of

the erotic register does not go far enough.
Masochism itself is inherently reliant on the
gaze as an essential part of the masochistic
theatre which allows it to function as a
fantasy. The intrinsic nature of the gaze in
relation to masochism is revealed by going
back to Freud’s initial discussion of sadism
and masochism, where he states that rather
than overemphasizing the element of pain
associated with these practices it is “the pleasure in any form of humiliation or subjection”
(Freud, 1924, p. 23) that should be our focus.
By tracing the etymology of ‘subjection’ to
the Latin subiectiōn, which means the “action
of placing something before one’s mental
vision” (OED), the important link between
these two perversions becomes clear. Lacan
further draws out this connection between
‘giving-to-see-it’ and masochism in Seminar
X: Anxiety where he notes the distinction
between voyeurism/exhibitionists and the
act of what he refers to as “letting something
be seen” (Lacan, 2016, p. 191) in masochism.
This means more than the specular image
being revealed in a process of ‘giving-to-see-it’
because it reveals something about the subject
that is normally concealed. Most interestingly,
Lacan believes that this revelation of “letting
something be seen” is anxiety-provoking for
both men and women, but for woman the
masquerade of femininity is uncovered to
show “what there is” (Lacan, 2016, p. 191) and
for man this revelation of desire only allows
“what there is not” (Lacan, 2016, p. 191) to be
uncovered, and we can understand this to be
his own anxiety.

Where are the Women?
Turning from Freud and Lacan to
Deleuze it becomes obvious that in most
discussions on masochism the women
have been relegated to a lesser position or
altogether forgotten. However, in Deleuze’s
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Coldness and Cruelty (1967) he pays particular
attention to the role of women in the writing
of Leopold von Sacher-Masoch; Deleuze
analyses the different fantasy women that appear in Masoch’s works, but this still remains
problematic for my discussion because the
woman is always described in relation to man’s
desire. These three women exist in a masochistic relationship with the men, but as female
tops they are not the masochistic directors,
nor are they sadists able to derive pleasure
from the situation, because the male bottoms
disregard woman’s pleasure. However, Deleuze
classifies the women as masochistic based on
them existing as “a pure element of masochism” (Deleuze, 1967, p. 42), and clarifies that
“it is a mistake to think that she is sadistic
or even pretending to be so” (Deleuze, 1967,
p. 42). Two extreme versions of woman are
identified as the Grecian woman and the
sadistic woman. The first type, the Grecian
woman, is the hetaera or Aphrodite, and “is
dedicated to love and beauty; she lives for
the moment” (Deleuze, 1967, p. 47). Deleuze
goes on to describe her as believing “in the
independence of women and in the fleeting
nature of love; for her the sexes are equal”
(1967, p. 47). Aphrodite is the “female principal” (Deleuze, 1967, p. 47) and the moment
of equality is the moment in which women
gain dominance over man because “man
trembles as soon as woman becomes his equal”
(Deleuze, 1967, p. 48). This version of woman
wants to cause chaos and destroy patriarchal
systems of control, including marriage, morality, the Church and the State because they are
“inventions of man” (Deleuze, 1967, p.48). The
opposite extreme version of woman in Masoch’s writing is the sadistic woman. As a sadist
“She enjoys hurting and torturing others, but
it is significant that her actions are prompted
by a man or otherwise performed in concert
with a man, whose victim she is always liable
to become” (Deleuze, 1967, p. 48). Deleuze
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proposes that these two versions of woman
are not the ideal type for Masoch because “At
one extreme masochism has yet to come into
operation, and at the other it has already lost
its raison d’être” (1967, p. 50). The true fantasy
woman instead falls somewhere in the middle
of these extremes, but is almost impossible
to pinpoint. This fantasy woman does not
actually exist anywhere within Masoch’s
writings, and Deleuze can only describe her
by piecing together various descriptions from
Masoch’s work; she is “cold—maternal—severe, icy—sentimental—cruel” (1967, p. 51).
This coldness applies not only to the woman
in the masochistic relationship, but also the
sadistic heroes found in sadomasochistic
literature. For Sade’s characters this is expressed
as apathy which is directed against all feelings.
Masoch differs here from Sade in that the
coldness connected with the fantasy woman
is not a “negation of feeling, but rather the
disavowal of sensuality” (Deleuze, 1967, p. 52).
For Masoch, this cruel and sentimental
woman is able to “compel man to thought
and properly constitute the masochistic ideal”
(Deleuze, 1967, p. 54). However, as I pointed
out earlier, this cold-hearted woman is not
the woman I seek; she does not enjoy her own
subjection and humiliation, and she instead
serves as the woman-as-fantasy who exists only
to torture the masochistic man.
The true Masochian woman is only
implied near the end of Masoch’s literary
case study of masochism, Venus in Furs; here,
Wanda ends her relationship with Severin
in order to have a master of her own. When
she ends her relationship with Severin she
says, “Not another slave, I have had enough of
them: a master. Women need to have a master
to worship” (Masoch, 1967, p. 258). Although
few details are provided about Wanda’s new
relationship with the Greek, the moral of
the tale is provided by Severin when he says,
“I was a fool…If only I had whipped her
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instead!” (Masoch, 1967, p. 271). However,
this would mean that instead of Severin
transforming into ‘the hammer’ he would have
to take on the fantasy role that the masochistic
woman plays in the work of Masoch. For if he
became the sadistic torturer in order to whip
Wanda their relationship would have been
incompatible.
In Angela Carter’s The Sadeian Woman
and the Ideology of Pornography (1979) she
examines the work of Sade as another literary
case study, and specifically focuses on the two
sisters Juliette and Justine. In Juliette she finds
the true Sadeian woman, who is also very
similar to the extreme sadistic woman that
Deleuze finds in the work of Masoch. Juliette’s
ability to become a Sadeian woman is based
on two things: her ability to be the “perfect
whore” (Carter, 1979, p. 92) and her rejection
of femininity. Juliette is motivated by financial
profit and libidinal gratification, and these
two things work together to ensure that she
does not have to submit to any law. Through
the use of her sexuality as power, “Juliette
transforms herself from pawn to queen in a
single move and henceforward goes wherever
she pleases on the chess board. Nevertheless,
there remains the question of the presence of
the king, who remains the lord of the game.”
(Carter, 1979, p. 91). Juliette lives in a patriarchal world which is “governed by god, the
king and the law” (Carter, 1979, p. 92), which
Carter describes as “the trifold masculine
symbols of authority” (1979, p. 92). Juliette
is aware of how to survive in this world, and
does so through her rational sexuality, but, like
the Oedipal mother Deleuze describes, she is
always at risk of becoming the victim, even as
she engages in sadistic torture.
In Rebecca Comay’s “Adorno avec
Sade…” she discusses the proximity between
Adorno and Horkheimer and Lacan’s work
on Sade. She points out that, for Adorno,
there exists:

nothing fascinating, nothing shocking,
nothing disgusting, nothing virulent…
but merely the tedious administration
of routine piled upon routine, bleached
out, neutralize, antiseptic: sodomy,
incest, mutilation, torture, coprophagy,
whatever, everything reduced to business as usual, Juliette as gym coach, the
bedroom as boardroom, boardroom as
boredom, boredom as the congealment
of the always-the-same. (Comay, 2006, p. 8)
This corresponds to the rituals of the libertines, which Carter compares to the Catholic
Church, and which Juliette is educated in to
become the Sadeian woman. The banality
which Comay associates with Sade’s smut also
applies to Juliette’s libertine education, which
is learned by rote, much the way schoolchildren endure learning multiplication tables.
For Juliette to become a perfect whore, and
eventually place herself “firmly in the camp of
the masters” (Carter, 1979, p. 98), requires the
ability to master the education she receives
from several older women figures. Carter traces
this education from the convent, where she
learns from the abbess Delbène “the elements
of sexual expertise, the relativity of ethics,
militant feminism and doctrinaire atheism”
(Carter, 1979, p. 93), to the brothel, where she
learns to steal, lie, and play a part in a male
fantasy. In the brothel her “virginity is sold
successively to fifty buyers” (Carter, 1979, p. 96)
and her apprenticeship is completed when she
sells her anus to an archbishop. Much like the
rote recitation of numbers, Juliette’s virginity
must be repeatedly sold in this banal way for
her to master her role as whore.
The ability of Juliette to learn these
various sexual acts is an example of Freud’s
theory of polymorphous perversity which
he outlines in Three Essays. His example of
the polymorphously perverse subject is the
‘uncultivated woman’ who learns to be poly-
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morphous through the repetition of different
sex acts with various partners. Freud provides
this description of the woman:

Under ordinary conditions she may
remain normal sexually, but if she is
led on by a clever seducer she will find
every sort of perversion to her taste,
and will retain them as part of her own
sexual activities. Prostitutes exploit the
same polymorphous, that is, infantile,
disposition for the purposes of their
profession…it becomes impossible not
to recognize that this same disposition
to perversions of every kind is a general
and fundamental human characteristic.
(1924, p. 57)

In this description of the process for
developing the polymorphously perverse
prostitute it is easy to locate Juliette’s own
education. She, however, does not stop at
becoming polymorphously perverse in order
to satisfy her customers, but instead seeks to
become “a Nietzschean superwoman, which
is to say, a woman who has transcended her
gender but not the contradictions inherent
in it” (Carter, 1979, p. 98). The contradiction
inherent in being a Sadeian women is just as
important for the Masochian woman; woman
is regarded as the ‘weaker sex,’ and so even
as a sadistic master, Juliette is always at risk
of becoming the victim of the libertine men.
For the Masochian woman, the same belief
that woman is weaker, and that masochism
itself has something feminine inherent to it,
means that a woman who enjoys being the
masochistic bottom is regarded as enjoying
her own patriarchal oppression. In theorizing
this woman though, it becomes clear that she
wields as much power as the Sadeian woman,
and like Juliette, learns to play a part in her
own masochistic fantasy by “[playing] with
mimesis” (Irigaray, 1985, p. 76). Therefore,

38

as Juliette adopts the libertine theatre of
cruelty, where she is willing to play any part,
and her moral purity, and that of mankind,
are found in her own infinitely polymorphously
perverse nature, the Masochian woman adopts
her own masochistic theatre, where she dictates
the roles to be played for herself and those who
enter her theatre.
In their discussion of sadism and masochism both Deleuze and Lacan destroy the
illusion of a dichotomy between the two perversions. Deleuze states that “The concurrence
of sadism and masochism is fundamentally
one of analogy only; their processes and their
formations are entirely different; their common
organ, their ‘eye,’ squints and should therefore
make us suspicious” (Deleuze, 1967, p. 46).
As I have already discussed, Deleuze sees all
the women in Masoch’s works as masochistic
in nature, because each woman “incarnates
instead the element of ‘inflicting pain’ in
an exclusively masochistic situation” (1967,
p. 42), and therefore the men have no need,
or desire, for the sadistic subject to enter into a
relationship with them. This understanding is
reiterated in Žižek’s article “Are We Allowed
To Enjoy Daphnée du Maurier?” where he
emphasizes that sadism involves domination,
and masochism involves liberation. The
incompatibility of these two perversions is
made clear through Žižek’s recounting of
Deleuze’s interpretation of Masoch: “far from
bringing any satisfaction to the sadistic witness,
the masochist’s self-torture frustrates the sadist,
depriving him of his power over the masochist”
(Žižek, 2004, n.p.).

Betwixt Sadism and
Masochism
While Deleuze presents the idea that the
sadist and the masochist are enacting different and separate dramas which involve them
in completely different interactions of the
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pleasure-pain complex (1967, p. 45), and are
therefore incompatible as a pair of subjects,
Lacan’s discussion of the subject provides
detailed differences which illustrate how and
why sadism and masochism are incompatible.
In Anxiety Lacan outlines the fact that these
two perversions are “not a reversible couple”
(2017, p. 177); He details the difference
between them, stating:

We find ourselves, betwixt sadism and
masochism, in the presence of what
presents itself as an alienation. That
which, at the second level, is veiled
and concealed in each of these two
subjects appears in the other party at
the level of what is targeted. There is an
occultation of anxiety in the first case,
of the object a in the other. This is not,
however, a process in reverse, a switcharound. (Lacan, 2017, p. 177)
It is the differing aims of sadism and
masochism which make the subject as sadist
and the subject as masochist completely
incompatible. The sadist seeks objet a in his
victim and, as Žižek makes clear, when he
does not receive what he seeks from the
masochist he is unsatisfied. The sadist wants
to invoke shame in the victim through
the gaze, but in masochism “the victim no
longer experiences shame, it openly displays
its jouissance” (Žižek, 2016, p.488). The
masochist, on the other hand, is thought to
seek the Other’s jouissance, but what this
mistaken belief conceals is the true aim of the
masochist: the Other’s anxiety. Thus, even if
the same exercise is performed in sadism and
masochism, the desire of these two figures is
completely different.
The first point which I will bring up is
the question of the value of masochism. Lacan
answers this by saying, “When desire and the
law find themselves together again, what the

masochist means to show—and I’ll add, on
his little stage, because this dimension should
never be lost sight of—is that the desire of
the Other lays down the law.” (Lacan, 2017,
p. 106). This statement echoes several of the
concepts already covered in this paper—the
dimension of looking and the importance of
the desire of the Other—and these concepts
will also prove to be crucially important for the
Masochian woman. Lacan goes on to discusses
masochism and he establishes that the aim of
the masochist is the Other’s anxiety, which has
been established as a different aim from the
sadist, who seeks the object a in the other.
In principle, the concept of women’s
masochism “is a male fantasy,” or the fantasy
of the big Other, and which Lacan goes on
to explain, “In this fantasy, it is by proxy and
in relation to the masochistic structure that
is imagined in woman that man sustains his
jouissance through something that is his
own anxiety. That is what the object covers
over. In men, the object is the condition of
desire.” (Lacan, 2017, p. 190). In contrast,
“For women, the desire of the Other is the
means by which her jouissance will have an
object that is, as it were, suitable.” (Lacan,
2017, p. 191). Thus, for masochism to exist
in women, even if it is ironic, Lacan believes
that the fantasy imagined by the Other, or
the male fantasy, is what is enacted. This leads
to the question of what role anxiety plays in
the male fantasy. As I have already stated,
Lacan believes the masochist’s aim is the
anxiety of the Other. If woman is enacting
a male fantasy, which causes anxiety in the
face of the Other’s desire, and man sustains
his jouissance through his own anxiety, what
is this anxiety? I believe Deleuze provides
the answer to this question in his own case
study of the three women figures in Masoch’s
work. It is the figure of the Grecian woman,
who “believes in the independence of women
and in the fleeting nature of love; for her the
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sexes are equal” (Deleuze 47), that is the cause
of anxiety for man. For Aphrodite equality
between men and women is the “crucial
moment at which she gains dominance over
man, for ‘man trembles as soon as woman
becomes his equal’” (47-48).
This raises the problem of how man can
reject the equality or dominance of woman
by enacting a masochistic fantasy. For the
male masochist, he “stages his own servitude”
(Žižek, 1994, p. 92), and in doing so the man
is the one “who actually pulls the strings and
dictates the activity of the woman [dominatrix]” (Žižek, 1994, p.92). Thus, the man is
always the one in control, and the constant
disavowal of real violence allows him to
confront the anxiety brought on by the Other
by acting it out in the masochistic theatre.
In Žižek’s The Metastases of Enjoyment: On
Women and Causality (1994) he compares
masochism with the concept of courtly love;
he cites Deleuze’s discussion of masochism
to prove the important point that sadism
and masochism follow opposite modes of
negation (violent domination vs disavowal
and controlled violence). In addition to these
opposite modes of negation, sadism and masochism also have structural differences in how
they are enacted by the analysand: institution
and contract. As Žižek shows, sadism uses the
“institutional power” to torment “its victim
and taking pleasure in the victim’s helpless
resistance” (91). This, however, is exactly what
the male masochist does not want, for, if he
is tortured by a sadist, he will be horrified at
being “reduced in the eyes of the Other to
objet a” (Žižek, 1994, p. 93). Žižek proposes
that in this case the masochist responds with
“irrational violence aimed at the other” (Žižek,
1994, p. 93). This hystericization is precisely
what happens to the masochist Severin in
Venus in Furs. When the Greek whips him,
rather than Wanda, he is horrified at being
reduced to objet a and feels he is “dying of
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shame and despair” (Masoch, 1991, p. 268).
In reaction it is only natural that he responds
with irrational violence when he becomes
‘the hammer’. Contrary to this institutional
violence of sadism, masochism is “made to the
measure of the victim: it is the victim…who
initiates a contract with the Master (woman),
authorizing her to humiliate him in any way
she considers appropriate” (Žižek, 1994, p. 91).
The keys to masochism are that the masochist
enacts the power of the contract, so he is
the one who is really in control, and that the
threat of actual violence is always interrupted.
Real violence is suspended and the entire
masochistic theatre, as its name suggests,
is an act or feigning of violence.

From Subordination to
Affirmation
How does the masochistic theatre then
allow woman to face her own anxiety, which,
as Lacan puts it, “is only anxiety faced with
the desire of the Other” (Lacan, 2017, p. 191)?
If women’s masochism is theoretically a male
fantasy, consisting of the man dominating
the woman, by enacting it in the masochistic
theatre the woman is traversing the fantasy,
and confronting the anxiety of the Other at
the same time. As established, masochism is
enacted and the rules set out contractually
by the ‘victim’. For woman, this means she is
able to escape the institutional and sadistic
violence, which permeates society, and instead
can enact the “endless repeating of an interrupted gesture” (Žižek, 1994, pp. 92). The full
meaning of women’s masochism becomes
clear in Žižek’s “Are We Allowed to Enjoy
Daphnée du Maurier?” when he proposes a
possible subversion of the fantasy of woman
by woman:

femininity is from the very beginning
split between Eve and Lilith, between
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‘ordinary’ hysterical feminine subject
and the fantasmatic spectre of Woman:
when a man is having sex with a ‘real’
woman, he is using her as a masturbatory prop to support his fantasizing
about the non-existent Woman…
And in Rebecca, her most famous
novel, du Maurier adds another twist
to the Lilith myth: the fantasy of Woman
is (re)appropriated by a woman—what
if Lilith is not so much a male fantasy as
the fantasy of a woman, the model of her
fantasmatic competitor? (Žižek, 2004, n.p.)
Thus, the role playing that takes place in
the masochistic theatre allows woman to
reappropriate the fantasy of a woman for her
own masochistic desire. The multifaceted
identity of woman Eve/Lilith follows the
Lacanian definition of the woman who ‘does
not exist,’ and she cannot be defined by one
single identity because she has always already
escaped signification.
This method of appropriation can be
compared to Irigaray’s feminist praxis of
mimicry and “[assuming] the feminine role
deliberately” (Irigaray, 1974, p. 76). In sadomasochism if the masochist is, to return to
Freud, the one who is placed “in a characteristically female situation” (Freud, 1924, p. 277),
then by assuming the role of the feminine
masochist for a woman is to reappropriate the
role of the feminine, and therefore “convert a
form of subordination into an affirmation, and
thus to begin to thwart it” (Irigaray, 1974, p. 76).
Žižek sets the groundwork for how this can
be accomplished through his explanation of
masochism through the libidinal economy of
courtly love. The courtly Lady is described as
a “cold, distanced, inhuman partner” (Žižek,
1994, p. 89), much like Masoch’s masochistic
women, and she assumes the role of the
master in the relationship by imposing on
the knight all sorts of “senseless, outrageous,

impossible, arbitrary, capricious ordeals” (Žižek,
1994, p. 90). However, as an object of men’s
desire, the courtly Lady provides a fantasystructure through which woman “refers to
herself with regard to her (potential) relationship to man” (Žižek, 1994, p. 108). The reaction
of (some forms of ) feminism to this structure
is one of panic because it cannot accept any
form of ‘patriarchal domination’ and this
becomes a problem because it undermines
“the fantasy-support of their own feminine
identity” (Žižek, 1994, p. 108). It is only in
the perverse (masochistic) contract, which is
established between equal subjects, that Žižek
shows us paradoxically “serves to establish a
relationship of domination” (1994, p. 109) via
the balanced contract. Žižek’s interpretation of
masochism through courtly love reveals that
in the masochistic relationship woman always
holds some form of power over the man.
When the woman is playing the dominatrix
she assumes the traditional role of the Lady
and makes ridiculous demands of the man
as knight. Conversely, when she plays the
subordinate role, what I have been referring to
as the Masochian woman, she still plays the
role of the Lady because she sets the terms of
the contract and still makes demands of the
man. When woman takes on this subservient
role, according to Lacan, she is enacting the
masquerade, a reference to Joan Riviere’s
“Womanliness as Masquerade” (1929), in
which she puts on the act of being feminine
in a defensive mode.
To take this defensive mode of the
masquerade one step further is to attempt to
use the act of femininity in order to “[jam] the
theoretical machinery itself, of suspending its
pretension to the production of a truth and
of a meaning that are excessively univocal”
(Irigaray, 1974, p. 78). Following Lacan’s
assertion that in masochism “the desire of
the Other lays down the law” (Lacan, 2017,
p. 106), the act of intentionally taking on a
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masochistic position for woman to achieve
pleasure is a conscious act which “can be found
only at the price of crossing back through the
mirror that subtends all speculation. For this
pleasure is not simply situated in a process of
reflection or mimesis, nor on one side of this
process or the other” (Irigaray, 1974, p. 77).
The law, or language, has traditionally been
denied to women through their “social inferiority” (Irigaray, 1974, p. 85), but through the
process of assuming the role of the subordinate
in the masochistic situation, woman is able to
define the terms of the contract and rewrite the
law, and language, in her favour. For Irigaray,
this type of “language work” takes on the function of casting phallocentrism “loose from its
moorings in order to return the masculine to
its own language, leaving open the possibility
of a different language” (1974, p. 80). Thus, the
masochistic contract, which is made possible
by the equality of the subjects, fulfills the fear
of woman’s dominance over man; it is written
in the language of the Masochian woman and
has the ability to subvert the phallocentric
language that dominates the rest of the world.
One of the key theoretical points for
coming to understand the Masochian women
is that of sexual difference. Following Lacan’s
starting point ‘The Woman does not exist,’ because there is no universal meaning to what it
is to be a woman, for a woman to understand
who she is a mimetic process occurs which
she learns from those around her. In Darian
Leader’s Why do Women Write More Letters
Than They Post? (1996), he presents several
hypothetical situations in which women place
themselves in the role of a man in order to
understand the way in which men relate to
other subjects, and particularly women, in the
case of heterosexual desire. Notably, Leader
says that women construct love triangles
because “a triangle is a necessary condition for
the study of someone else’s desire” (Leader,
1996, p. 5). This type of triangulation can be
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tied directly back to the masochistic theatre
and the audience which is implied to be viewing the masochistic action take place. Thus,
the gaze, and the mimetic response which
follows, is a crucial part of sexual difference for
woman. Another factor which must be taken
into consideration when discussing sexual
difference is feminine jouissance. Grounded
in the fact that woman is not whole, woman
has what Lacan calls “a supplementary jouissance compared to what the phallic function
designates by way of jouissance” (Lacan, 1999,
p. 73). This feminine jouissance is described
by Lacan as being what “one experiences and
yet knows nothing about” (1999, p. 77). One
of the primary examples Lacan gives to show
that this extra (en plus) jouissance exists, but
cannot be put into language, is the statue
“The Ecstasy of St. Teresa” (1999, p. 76). The
challenge to describe feminine jouissance
put forth by Lacan is answered by Irigaray in
Speculum of the Other Woman (1974). Here she
takes the same figure of a woman, Saint Teresa
of Avila, and instead of silencing her by only
considering her as a statue, she looks to her
writings to find the description of this extra
jouissance. Irigaray makes direct reference to
Saint Teresa when she writes, “How strange is
the economy of this specula(riza)tion of woman,
who in her mirror seems ever to refer back to
a transcendence. Who moves away (for) who
comes near, who groans to be separated from
the one who holds her closest in his embrace”
(Irigaray, 1974, p. 201). The footnote, quoting
from Saint Teresa’s vision of the Flaming
Heart, refers to pain which “was so great that
it made me moan, and yet so surpassing was
the sweetness of this excessive pain that I
could not wish to be rid of it” (Irigaray, 1974,
p. 201). This experience of feminine jouissance,
which in statue form Lacan insists that it
cannot be denied Saint Teresa is ‘coming,’
is a description of an experience which is
undeniably masochistic. Irigaray’s interpreta-
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tion of this vision is that it is an experience of
transcendence, unmistakably masochistic, and
is a part of the specularization of woman.
This connection back to the mimetic function
of the mirror stage and the gaze is described by
Irigaray as “the work of death” (1974, p. 54).
In thinking through the ironic masochism
of women, it becomes clear that, in materialist
terms, it is a contradictory concept, and it is
in contradictions where the truth is found.2
Thus, by theorizing the seemingly ironic
Masochian Woman, it becomes clear that
within the masochistic contract submission
requires equality between men and women
to come first. Therefore, it becomes apparent
that thinking through each contradiction,
in turn, leads us to another contradiction.
Following this logic, when women enact
masochism, its success depends on equality
between man and woman, but the outcome is
the dominance of the masochistic woman.

2

From Hegel’s thesis “Contradictio ist regula veri, non-contradictio falsi,” or “Contradiction is the rule of the
true, non-contradiction of the false” (Dolar, 2017, p. 87).
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